!

This is the work of many apes. Thank you, all of you for sharing this info with me! Extra shout out to u/da_squirrel_monkey, u/Working-Yesterday243 and u/PutPsychological8698. It's like a wiki, so please let me know if anything is incorrect or outdated. And share your experiences with brokers!

DRS FAQs

Computershare FAQs

US IRAs: Come check out my IRA overview! __________________________________ BROKERS THAT CAN DRS TRANSFER

1. Ally Invest 🇺🇸 GUIDE $115 fee. Thanks u/Bonesaparte
2. Alpaca 🇺🇲 GUIDE Thanks u/Apprehensive-Donkey3
3. Avanza 🇸🇪 GUIDE YOU NEED A CS ACCOUNT NUMBER $30/300 SEK fee. Thanks u/MustbetheEvilTwin
4. Avenue 🇧🇷 GUIDE US$150 fee. Thanks u/rockertseeker
5. Baader Bank 🇩🇪 GUIDE $5 fee
6. Bank of Scotland 🇬🇧 GUIDE $0 fee
7. BBVA 🇲🇽 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/Alarizpe
8. BCEE 🇱🇺 GUIDE €50 fee. thanks u/luxowoman
9. BNP Paribas 🇫🇷 GUIDE €75 fee
10. BMO Investorline 🇨🇦 GUIDE $100 fee. Thanks u/Lacklusterbeverage
11. Cash App 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
12. Chase/JP Morgan 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
13. Charles Schwab 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
14. Charles Stanley 🇬🇧 GUIDE £50 fee. Thanks u/Hooded-Redditor
15. CIBC 🇨🇦 GUIDE $50 fee. Thanks u/PoMo-G
16. Citi Bank HK 🇭🇰 GUIDE YOU NEED A CS ACCOUNT NUMBER $50 fee
17. Citi Bank US 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
18. Crédit Mutuel 🇫🇷 GUIDE €40 fee
19. Danske Bank 🇩🇰 GUIDE 400DKK fee. Thanks u/Ashage
20. DIRECTA SIM 🇮🇹 GUIDE YOU NEED A CS ACCOUNT NUMBER $75 fee
21. Disnat 🇨🇦 GUIDE $150 fee.
22. DKB 🇩🇪 GUIDE YOU NEED A CS ACCOUNT NUMBER. $0 fee. Thanks u/TheDocJekyll69
23. DNB 🇳🇴 GUIDE NOK2000 Fee. Thanks u/Fiksdal
24. E*Trade 🇺🇲 GUIDE $60 fee. Thanks u/jforest1 and u/JustAnuthaLooser
25. Fidelity 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
26. FirsTrade 🇺🇲 GUIDE $215 Fee. Thanks u/tubaman23
27. Flatex 🇩🇪 🇦🇹 GUIDE €80/hour fee. Thanks u/Critical-Turnover858
28. Flink 🇲🇽 GUIDE $130 fee. Thanks u/tiacuache_bebe
29. Halifax 🇬🇧 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/Rat-Soup-Eating-MF
30. Hatch 🇳🇿 GUIDE NZ$55 fee. Thanks u/HatchInvestTeam
31. HSBC UK 🇬🇧 GUIDE £55 fee. Thanks u/Sgt_Bizkit
32. IBKR/Interactive Brokers 🌎 GUIDE $5 fee.
33. IG Australia 🇦🇺 🇿🇦 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/FriskyGrub
34. IG UK 🇬🇧 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/Similar-Musician
35. iWeb 🇬🇧 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/Rat-Soup-Eating-MF
36. LHV Bank 🇪🇪 🇷🇺 GUIDE €10 fee. Thanks u/addyzagurski
37. Lloyds 🇬🇧 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/Rat-Soup-Eating-MF
38. LPL Financial 🇺🇲 GUIDE $25 Fee?
39. Lynx 🇳🇱 🇧🇪 🇫🇷 🇩🇪 🇨🇿 🇵🇱 🇸🇰 🇫🇮 GUIDE $5 fee
40. M1 Finance 🇺🇲 GUIDE $115 fee
41. Merrill Edge 🇺🇲 GUIDE $25 fee. Thanks u/Strooticus
42. MeXeM 🇳🇱 🇧🇪 🇩🇪 🇦🇹 🇮🇹 🇨🇾 GUIDE $5 fee. Thanks u/patrickvl
43. Morgan Stanley 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/RealPropRandy
44. Nabtrade 🇦🇺 GUIDE $0 fee
45. National Bank 🇨🇦 GUIDE US$150 fee
46. Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU) 🇺🇲 GUIDE $55 fee. Thanks u/OccasionQuick
47. Philips Securities (POEMS) 🇸🇬 GUIDE SG$53.50 + US$50 fee
48. PostFinance 🇨🇭 GUIDE $200 fee
49. Public.com 🇺🇲 GUIDE $100 fee. Thanks u/Spelunkingpunk
50. QTrade 🇨🇦 GUIDE $300 fee. Thanks u/Toxsic99
51. Questrade 🇨🇦 GUIDE $300 fee
52. Rabo Bank 🇳🇱 GUIDE €55 fee
53. Raiffeisen 🇦🇹 🇨🇭 🇩🇪 🇦🇱 🇷🇴 🇧🇬 🇨🇿 🇭🇺 🇷🇺 🇷🇸 🇺🇦 GUIDE YOU NEED A CS ACCOUNT NUMBER. 86.14CHF fee (inc. VAT). Thanks u/unasinni
54. RBC 🇨🇦 GUIDE $50 fee
55. Revolut 🇪🇺 GUIDE (temporarily unable to transfer) $55 fee. Thanks u/bennysphere and u/AbuseUDna
56. S Broker 🇩🇪 GUIDE YOU NEED A CS ACCOUNT NUMBER. $0 fee
57. Saxo trader 🌎 GUIDE $25 fee
58. Scotia iTrade 🇨🇦 GUIDE $100 fee
59. Seibert 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
60. SOFi 🇺🇲 GUIDE $115 fee
61. Sparkasse 🇩🇪 GUIDE YOU NEED A CS ACCOUNT NUMBER. $0 fee
62. Sproutfi 🇧🇷 GUIDE $55 US fee
63. Stake 🇦🇺 GUIDE $200 fee
64. Stockal 🇮🇳 GUIDE $0 or $130 fee
65. SuperHero 🇦🇺 GUIDE $115 fee. Thanks u/nas_tsoftg
66. Swissquote 🇨🇭 GUIDE $200 fee
67. T. Rowe Price 🇺🇲 GUIDE $15 fee
68. TastyTrade 🇺🇲 GUIDE $115 fee
69. TD Ameritrade 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
70. TD Canadatrust 🇨🇦 GUIDE $80 fee
71. TIAA Brokerage 🇺🇲 GUIDE $30 fee. Thanks u/daa4th
72. TradeStation 🌏 GUIDE $25 fee. Thanks u/HelloYouBeautiful
73. TradeZero 🇺🇲 GUIDE $250 fee
74. UBS 🌏 GUIDE $0 fee
75. US Bank 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/AccidentallySnide
76. Vanguard 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee. Thanks u/andersennavy
77. Volksbank 🇩🇪 GUIDE €25-€30 fee. Thanks u/Antilles2
78. WealthSimple 🇨🇦 GUIDE $304 fee
79. Webull 🇺🇲 GUIDE $115 fee
80. Wells Fargo 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee
81. Westpac 🇦🇺 GUIDE $10 fee
82. XTB 🌏 GUIDE $25 USD fee __________________________________ NOT YET POSSIBLE ^(Apes coming for you)^
83. 1822direkt 🇩🇪 NO DRS, but can transfer out
84. ABN AMRO 🇳🇱 GUIDE €30 fee. There is a way out
85. Acorns 🇺🇲 GUIDE $50 fee. There is a way out
86. AJ Bell 🇬🇧 GUIDE £0 fee. There is a way out
87. ANZ 🇦🇺 GUIDE $100 fee. There is a way out
88. Banca Sella 🇮🇹 GUIDE There is a way out
89. Belfius 🇧🇪 GUIDE There is a way out
90. Bendigo Bank 🇦🇺 GUIDE There is a way out
91. Bolero 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out. €50 fee. Thanks u/Anth_o_ny
92. Bourse Direct 🇫🇷 GUIDE There is a way out
93. Capital.com 🌎 GUIDE Capital do not do transfers, but there is a way out
94. CMC Markets 🇦🇺 GUIDE AU$100 fee. There is a way out
95. Comdirect 🇩🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €25 fee
96. Commerzbank 🇩🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €150 fee
97. Commsec 🇦🇺 GUIDE There is a way out. $0 fee
98. Consors Bank 🇩🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €30-€45 fee
99. CREDEM Banca 🇮🇹 GUIDE There is a way out
100. Dad.at 🇦🇹 GUIDE There is a way out. €? fee
101. DeGiro 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out. Thanks u/Working-Yesterday243 and u/Quetzacoal. €56 fee.
102. Deutsche Bank 🇩🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €? fee
103. EasyBourse 🇫🇷
104. Elana Trading 🇧🇬 GUIDE There is a way out. €25, or 12BGN + 1% market value fee
105. Erste Bank 🇦🇹 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out. €49,75 fee
106. Etoro 🌏 GUIDE Etoro do not do transfers, but there is a way out
107. Exante 🇲🇹 🇨🇾 🇪🇺 GUIDE €150 fee. There is a way out
108. Fidelity UK 🇬🇧 GUIDE There is a way out. Thanks u/thesakar
109. Fineco 🇮🇹 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out
110. Freetrade 🇬🇧 GUIDE Freetrade can transfer US stocks in, but do not allow transfers out. But there is a way out
111. Futubull 🇭🇰 GUIDE There is a way out. Thanks u/ggame0598
112. GBM 🇺🇲 🇲🇽 GUIDE There is a way out
113. Gotrade 🇺🇲 GUIDE Gotrade do not do transfers, but there is a way out
114. Hargreaves Lansdown 🇬🇧 GUIDE There is a way out. Thanks u/Maleficent-Rub-4805
115. HSBC HK 🇭🇰 GUIDE There is a way out. Thank you u/ggame0598 for this info
116. INDMoney 🇮🇳 NO DRS, but can transfer out. Thanks u/vlskh
117. ING 🇳🇱 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out
118. Interactive Investor 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out
119. Intesa 🇮🇹 GUIDE There is a way out. Thanks u/Far_Limit6592
120. Keytrade 🇧🇪 GUIDE €35+VAT fee. There is a way out
121. moomoo 🇸🇬 NO DRS, but can transfer out
122. Ninety Nine 🇪🇸 GUIDE There is a way out. €? fee
123. Nordnet 🇸🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €50 fee
124. OnVista 🇩🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €? fee
125. OpenBank 🇪🇸 GUIDE There is a way out. €? fee
126. Postbank 🇩🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €0 fee. Thanks u/FrankiHollywood
127. Rakuten Securities 🇯🇵 GUIDE There is a way out. $? fee
128. Renta 4 🇨🇱 GUIDE There is a way out. €? fee
129. Robinhood 🇺🇲 GUIDE There is a way out. $75 fee
130. Santander 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out. $0 fee
131. Scalable Capital 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out! Thanks u/Lorunification
132. SEB Bank 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out
133. SelfWealth 🇦🇺 GUIDE There is a way out. $110 fee
134. Sharesies 🇳🇿 GUIDE Sharesies do not do transfers, but there is a way out
135. SmartBroker 🇩🇪 GUIDE There is a way out. €? fee
136. SoFi HK 🇭🇰 GUIDE $150 fee. There is a way out
137. St. George 🇦🇺 GUIDE AU$100 fee. There is a way out
138. Stash 🇺🇲 GUIDE There is a way out
139. Stockpile 🇺🇲 GUIDE There is a way out
140. Swedbank 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out
141. T212 🇪🇺 GUIDE T212 do not do transfers, but there is a way out
142. Tiger Broker 🇸🇬 GUIDE There is a way out. $150 fee
143. Trade Republic 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out
144. Tradernet 🇪🇺 GUIDE There is a way out. $60 fee
145. Vested 🇮🇳 NO DRS, but can transfer out. Thanks u/vlskh
146. Wealthfront 🇺🇲 GUIDE $0 fee. There is a way out
147. Wombat 🇬🇧 GUIDE Wombat do not do transfers, but there is a way out
148. X-O 🇬🇧 GUIDE There is a way out. £15 fee
149. Zaba 🇭🇷 GUIDE There is a way out. Thanks u/femanon_cro

__________________________________ US IRAs: Come check out my IRA overview!

AUSSIE SUPERANNUATIONS

!

!

“Roaring Kitty, once I decided to follow you, you promised to walk with me all the way. But during the most troublesome times, there is only one set of footprints. When I needed you most, why did you leave me?”

“My precious child, during your times of trial and suffering, when you see only one set of footprints, it was then that I carried you.”

(original content)

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/9Mrw1OnwkS

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/6UCtww93UB

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/0riinDTG2l

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/UAtkfWwG1d

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/ZwBH9KL425

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/BizpwMAzvb

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/cgg6iKqXsi

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/ueWSGIFTdm

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/7E17M2dfPY

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/1MRCid7h7v

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/qRaAcvbGN8

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/mDwUgyTwwj

https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/s/MomNsGbfsC

=========== End of Message

Now, this is something I personally want to add: this what happened to him it's the last of many shitty things that happened during this saga. When the time comes, remember all these events, how people got abused and harrassed - and make them pay the RIGHT price (which is a cell and all they own and more). Because I will. Oh, if I will...

💎🤲🏻

Looks like an interesting day ahead.

I'm drinking lots of water.

Edit: I ffnd myself in agreement with speculation that this might be a dangerous and expensive (desperate?) rug pull to buck more investors off their back. Likely will just demonstrate how disconnected they are and might run away from them.

In this tweet from @TheRoaringKitty [0], a pizza is repeatedly sliced into thinner and thinner slices. This is a reference to the reply from New York Federal Reserve to the Clearing and Legal Certainty Group from the European Commission [1].

When you buy stock, you don't actually get stock –– just a security entitlement. This is a pro-rata share of the stock held by the intermediary. When other shareholders DRS, then their security entitlements at the intermediary become real stock at the transfer agent.

So the intermediary is left with less and less stock, and your pro rata share gets smaller and smaller. Like the thinner and thinner slices of pizza.

[0] https://twitter.com/TheRoaringKitty/status/1790770363627921776 [1] https://archive.org/details/ec-clearing-questionnaire

This one's been around in other media, tallest building in Ft Worth just sold for 10% at a foreclosure auction.

This on top of the pressure from work from home and GME investors not budging.

!

I also buried a "NO 4" in this lines on this one

!

I get an error and need to reload nearly every time.

https://sitereport.netcraft.com/?url=http://lemmy.whynotdrs.org

I wonder if cloudflare has any connections with shf's.

Second time around, they're hoping we'll miss this one.

Link...https://old.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1ciqum4/simians_smash_sec_rule_proposal_to_reduce_margin/

From post, full post has long template... "Well done fellow Simians! 👏 Thanks to OVER 2500+ of you beautiful apes, the SEC has decided the OCC Proposal to Reduce Margin Requirements To Prevent A Cascade of Clearing Member Failures is dog shit wrapped in cat shit. We need to kick this while it's down so it's out of the game.

... the Commission is providing notice of the grounds for disapproval under consideration.

[SR-OCC-2024-001 34-100009 (pg 4); Federal Register]

​

Notice of the grounds for DISAPPROVAL

The phrase "notice of the grounds for DISAPPROVAL" is formal speak for "here are the reasons why this is bullshit". HOWEVER, the rule proposal isn't dead yet. Part of the bureaucratic process is this notification of why it should be disapproved followed by a comment period where the rule proposer and supporters (e.g., OCC, Wall St, and Kenny's friends) can comment and try to push this through by convincing the SEC otherwise.

Apes can also comment on the rule proposal IN SUPPORT OF THE SEC and the grounds for disapproval. It's time to kick this to the curb.

SEC's Reasons This Proposal Is BS..."

Noticed this post on reddit, decided to give this >40 minute documentary a watch.

A review of GAMESTOP to the MOON - How Reddit almost triggered an Economic Crisis | FD Finance

★★☆☆☆

2/5, would not recommend.

TLDR: documentary focuses primarily on the events of late 2020 and early 2021, conflates AMC and GME as equivalent things, concludes with the insinuation that all AMC, GME, and NFT investors are losers that have lost almost everything

----

• Title of the documentary does not match the content of the documentary. A more appropriate title might have been "the story of Reddit day traders pumping AMC and GME." That is what this documentary was about.

• paints most of these investors as either foolish day traders or naive investors, uses words like "gambling", "casino"

• lots of FUD sentiment throughout

• a few of these investors made a lots of money while most investors were losers

• 32:04 "GameStop led the way. And, as a group, the totality of the group picked AMC next. And, it wasn't like somebody said oh man we're all gonna go over to AMC, it's just kind of you know, that's where the flow goes, that's where the chatter goes, and AMC was the next stock."

• for some reason, out of nowhere, in the final 5 minutes the documentary suddenly starts talking about NFTs and makes them out to be pointless. Doesn't mention GameStop's relationship with NFTs but in stead focuses on how NFTs were a speculative bubble with foolish investors, just like with AMC and GME.

Total waste of time. I don't know who the intended audience was for this, but this is just more pointless narrating about the lives of people that experienced events that happened 3 years ago, concluding that the story is over and all those people that didn't get out with gains are losers that are never going to win.

It's as if the media like this is stuck in the year 2021. Reddit. Wallstreetbets. AMC. GameStop. Day traders. Robinhood. Down 90% since peak. The end.

So far today the CEO of HSBC has suddenly resigned… https://archive.ph/SgxD2

archive.today webpage capture Saved from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czkvnd4g44ro no other snapshots from this url 30 Apr 2024 13:31:34 UTC

HSBC chief executive unexpectedly steps down 7 hours ago

João da Silva, Business reporter

Noel Quinn has led the banking giant for nearly five years.

HSBC’s group chief executive Noel Quinn is unexpectedly retiring after nearly five years in the role.

Europe’s largest bank says it is in the process of finding a successor for 62-year-old Mr Quinn, who will stay in the role until a new chief executive is named. HSBC is considering candidates from both inside and outside the firm.

It comes as the UK-based lender reported a 1.8% drop in profit for the first three months of 2024, compared to the same time last year. The company said that its pre-tax profit for the period came in at $12.7bn (£10bn), which was a little better than expected by market analysts. "After an intense five years, it is now the right time for me to get a better balance between my personal and business life,” Mr Quinn said.

Mr Quinn, who has worked at HSBC for 37 years, was first appointed as its chief executive on an interim basis in 2019, after his predecessor John Flint was ousted from the role. In March 2020, he took the reins of HSBC on a permanent basis. “[Mr Quinn] has driven both our transformation strategy and created a simpler, more focused business that delivers higher returns,” HSBC’s chairman Mark Tucker said. Along with its quarterly results, the bank announced an interim payout to investors of $0.10 per share and said it would buy back up to $3bn of its shares.

HSBC recently completed the sale of its operations in Canada and announced plans to do the same with its business in Argentina. The sales are part of efforts by the London-based bank to focus more on faster-growing markets in Asia.

Shanti Kelemen, chief investment office at M&G Wealth, told the BBC’s Today programme that it “has probably been a very intense five years” and that Mr Quinn “has had a very long career”.

She said that Mr Quinn had changed the shape of the bank during his time at the top, by such actions as selling HSBC’s Argentina business, leaving Canada, and stepping up Asia operations. “What he’s done will probably reverberate and determine the path of their success for certainly several years to come,” she added. UK banking International Business HSBC

"The Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities closed Republic First Bank (operating as Republic Bank), with the FDIC appointed as receiver.

Fulton Bank has agreed to assume nearly all deposits and purchase almost all assets of Republic Bank. Republic Bank's 32 branches across New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York will reopen as Fulton Bank branches, and customers can access their funds through checks, ATMs, or debit cards. Existing checks and loan payments will continue to be processed as usual.

Depositors of Republic Bank will automatically become depositors of Fulton Bank, maintaining their existing deposit insurance coverage without needing to change their banking relationships.

As of January 31, 2024, Republic Bank had about $6 billion in assets and $4 billion in deposits. The estimated cost of this bank failure to the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund is $667 million, with the acquisition by Fulton Bank being the least costly resolution compared to other options.

" A steep price cut on a San Francisco building marks one of the starkest recent indicators of the city’s struggling office market. An empty 16-story building at 995 Market St. just sold for $6.5 million, a nearly 90% plunge from its 2016 price of $62 million.

The mid-Market tower at the corner of Sixth Street once housed Burning Man’s headquarters, as well as a large WeWork space. But once the co-working firm departed, the building failed to fill the gap and hasn’t been generating revenue for some time.

The site’s previous owner, Bridgeton, stopped making monthly payments on the tower last year and defaulted on its loan in December. The public auction sale, which the San Francisco Business Times first reported on, marks a stunning discount for the buyer, LNR Partners, an affiliate of Florida-based investor Starwood Property Trust. LNR had also been appointed to oversee the distressed loan.

The price drop reflects the site’s transition from a leased-out hub during during a boom-time for tech, to a space that’s sat empty while remote work has ravaged San Francisco offices overall.

“Office markets are going through what some are calling ‘The Great Reset,’” Derek Daniels, regional director of research at Colliers, told SFGATE. The market of today isn’t the market of 2016, and sales like this reflect a necessary adjustment. Buildings changing hands and resetting their values will also affect rents and lease rates across the market, he said.

“Any transactions happening right now, particularly in the mid-Market area, are a generally positive sign for San Francisco offices,” he added"

Dismal just posted this on Super stonk... "On April 30, 2024 DTC will implement changes to modify collateral value for certain securities, which may affect the value of positions applied to the Collateral Monitor.

The increase in the haircut for corporate bonds rated B1 to B3 from 50% to 70% significantly decreases the value of these bonds as collateral.

The assignment of a 100% haircut to ETFs and investment vehicles that include cryptocurrencies as an underlying asset renders these investments valueless for collateral purposes.

This reduction may lead to margin calls for participants using these instruments to secure short positions against GameStop."

OG file... https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/pdf/2024/4/26/B20002-24.pdf

Dismal's writeup with charts... https://dismal-jellyfish.com/significant-changes-to-dtc-collateral-values-announced/

!

Power to the collectors !

100% (305M)

• "24.6%" in DRS (75.4M)
• 22.3% Public Shorts (60.2M)
• 17.3% Insiders (52.9M w/ Insider+Stagnant)
• 10.9% Institutions (33.4M)
• 11.4% MF (34.8M)
• 9.9% ETFs (30.3M)

96.4% (Or 3.6% left for purchase/shorts)

For there to be no synthetics, there can only be 10.9M in brokerage accounts which would mean apes have DRSd >87% of their total holdings

Or maybe; just maybe, there is a chance of synthetics Chives Bibic Animorph jersan SubDRSive ;)?

Tennessee House Bill 2806 / Senate Bill 2640 amends the Uniform Commercial Code to:

• Move the jurisdiction for security entitlements to Tennessee
• Give entitlement holders priority over secured creditors of intermediaries

The civil justice subcommittee hearing features testimony from:

• David Webb –– author of The Great Taking
• Don Grande –– private practice attorney
• Andy Guggenheim –– Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
• Tim Amos –– uniform law commissioner

Andy Guggenheim: "While holding securities in street name is the most common choice for investors, they do have alternatives for holding securities in other ways if they prefer including physical form via stock certificate when that is available by the issuing company." (He won't say the word DRS!)

David Webb: "DTCC itself is planning to start up and pre-fund a new central clearing counterparty when one of the existing ones fails. The industry is talking about the very real possibility that major central counterparties will fail."

Related Links:

• Bill Text
• Legislative History
• Video of the Civil Justice Subcommittee Hearing
• EU Clearing and Settlement Legal Certainty Group Questionnaire

No reason to go to the link unless you're in IT in some way, but someone mentioned in that convo that AI companies are floating loans for 100's of millions to build data centers...no problrm right? Is that the theme from Jaws?

But thats not all; they're using the processor chips as collateral! Think how fast those lose value, add in a looming CRE/CMBS disaster we've mentioned many times, then consider that if they miss a payment the note-holder will have what recourse? Some outdated Nvidia graphics cards to repo.

It's like they're purposely setting out to nuke the future economy.

Perhaps to fuck long holders over? And retirees? And set them at each other?

The only answer I can summon is that the powers think that the economy will end soon and are grabbing everything they can in a panic.

GameStop’s earnings report: 15 things you might have missed

GameStop published their latest form 10-K on March 26, 2024. While the filing date was on March 26, the document date is February 3, 2024. In this article we dive deeper into the filing and highlight some interesting bits you might have missed.

You can find the form or read along with us right here!

Our merchandise? Collectibles, which included digital asset wallet and NFT marketplace activities

On page 2 of the filing GameStop mentions their merchandise, which includes hardware, accessories, software, and collectibles. Under collectibles they mention their collectibles also included the digital asset wallet and the NFT marketplace activities. “However, both activities were wound down in the fourth quarter of 2023.”

GameStop refurbishes products and recycles and achieved a reduction in YoY carbon emissions in excess of 10%

Also on page 2 there is mention of sustainability. “In 2023 alone, through our U.S. refurbishment center, we refurbished over 1.1 million software discs and over 3.0 million consumer electronic devices, and recycled over 0.6 million pounds of e-waste.”

States with the most and least store locations

Based on the map, one could say there are more GameStop locations on the east coast of the US and fewer in states that are more distant.

GameStop’s competition

According to the filing, GameStop says their competitors in the USA (among others) are:

• Walmart
• Target
• Best Buy
• Amazon

In Europe they are FNAC-Darty, Media Markt-Saturn, Amazon, and major hypermarket chains like Carrefour.

In Australia: JB HiFi, Big W, Target, and Amazon.

Every region has Amazon as GameStop’s competitor. This goes hand in hand with Chewy going head-to-head with Amazon and GameStop wanting to become an Amazon-killer.

Interesting reminder: Matt Furlong, former GameStop CEO was an executive at Amazon.

Scholarships

GameStop says they have provided more than $800,000 in scholarships, as per page 5.

Holiday season can have a big impact on financial results

On page 7, under the RISK FACTORS item, GameStop mentions a potential reason why Q4 2023 revenue was less than expected. “Our business, like that of many retailers, is seasonal, with a major portion of our sales and operating profit realized during the fourth quarter of fiscal 2023. (…) Any adverse trend in sales during the holiday selling season could lower our results of operations for the fourth quarter and the entire fiscal year and adversely impact our liquidity.”

Risks related to their common stock include some interesting things

Starting on page 12, GameStop lists risks related to their common stock. Some notable parts:

• “Short squeezes”. “A large proportion of our Class A Common Stock has been and may continue to be traded by short sellers which may increase the likelihood that our Class A Common Stock will be the target of a short squeeze. A short squeeze has previously led and could continue to lead to volatile price movements in shares of our Class A Common Stock that are unrelated or disproportionate to our operating performance or prospects and, once investors purchase the shares of our Class A Common Stock necessary to cover their short positions, the price of our Class A Common Stock may rapidly decline. Stockholders that purchase shares of our Class A Common Stock during a short squeeze may lose a significant portion of their investment.”
• Comments by analysts, blogs, articles, message boards, and social and other media.
• Large stockholders exiting their position or an increase or decrease in the short interest.
• Actual or anticipated fluctuations in our financial and operating results.
• Acquisition costs and the integration of companies we acquire or invest in.
• The costs associated with the exit of unprofitable markets, businesses or stores.
• Some interesting aspects, which are thoroughly known by GameStop’s retail investors.

2024 has the most amount of store leases expiring

At total of 1,350 lease terms will expire in fiscal 2024. This offers flexibility for extension or relocation.

Size of offices and distribution facilities

Office and distribution facilities total an approximate of 2 million square feet, which is the size of this:

Or almost as big as Grand Central Station.

Does not anticipate a dividend

Written on page 17, GameStop says “During the past four fiscal years, we have not declared, and do not anticipate declaring in the near term, dividends on shares of our Class A Common Stock.”

Simplified stock chart on page 17

Thanks GameStop, this is sure to raise questions when asking unknowing traders and investors what that big spike in 2021 was!

GameStop also provides a convenient table to see how the stock’s price has fared against the general market:

GameStop mentions the market price of its stock has been extremely volatile due to circumstances, including a short squeeze

“As noted above under the heading “Risk Factors — Risk Related to Our Common Stock”, the market price of our Class A Common Stock has been extremely volatile due to circumstances outside of our control, including a short squeeze that led to volatile price movements that were unrelated or disproportionate to our operating performance.” (Page 18)

Cash on hand is actually $921.7 million

Though in total, GameStop has control over more than $1.1 billion and $475.7 of available borrowing capacity under their revolving credit facilities, but that 1.1 billion includes marketable securities of $277.6 million. GameStop mentions this on page 22.

The only remaining debt is $28.5 million and consists of six separate unsecured term loans

They are held by Micromania SAS, the French subsidiary of GameStop. The total amount was €40 million (just over $42 million) in fiscal 2021. You can find it on page 22.

Advertising expenses decreased a lot

“Advertising expenses for fiscal 2023, 2022 and 2021 totaled $39.3 million, $75.0 million and $93.6 million, respectively.” This is stated on page 44.

We might have easily missed more interesting or important information. That’s no surprise, seeing as how big reports can be. Which things you read in the 10-K were the most surprising or interesting to you? Let us know in a comment!

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data source: GameStop 10-K filings - Google Sheets document

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Power to the collectors! !

Here is another representation of GameStop's FY23 income statement, this time showing clearly that GameStop had an operating loss of $34.5 M ( compared with an operating loss of $311 M FY22 !)

If not for the $49.5 M from interest income, GameStop would not have had positive net earnings in FY23.

Operating loss of $35 M (compared with operating loss of $312 M in FY22)

Small but notable net earnings of $6.7 M (compared with net loss of $313 M in FY22)

How did GameStop make $50 million in interest income?

GameStop was profitable for the first time in 6 years

GameStop reported full-year profitability for fiscal year 2023, contradicting the prevailing media sentiment that GameStop is a terrible company destined for bankruptcy

Summary

• On March 26, 2024, GameStop released financial results for the fourth quarter and fiscal year ended February 3, 2024, demonstrating small but not insignificant full-year profits for the first time in 6 years, despite reduced revenues. "Net income was $6.7 million for fiscal year 2023, compared to a net loss of $313.1 million for fiscal year 2022."
• Sentiment of GameStop found in financial media continues to be negative, dishonest, and cynical, despite the undeniable but often ignored improvements to the fundamentals of the company that have been achieved by the new management team. In most cases, the fact that GameStop was profitable for the first time in 6 years is not even mentioned at all.

Historical context

From a historical point of view, GameStop was consistently profitable every fiscal year from 2005 through 2016, with the exception of 2012. Starting in fiscal year 2017, GameStop began showing reduced profitability, and from FY 2018 through FY 2022, was unprofitable.

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Source: GameStop 10-K filings - Google Sheets

Looking exclusively at revenue, it is clear that there has been a significant reduction starting approximately with fiscal year 2019. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that gamers are increasingly buying games digitally rather than in the form of physical discs such as can be purchased at a brick-and-mortar retail store like GameStop.

Yet, even in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, it is clear that despite high revenues the company was not performing well.

Heading through 2020, GameStop was undeniably a struggling company facing significant challenges, and according to many was destined for bankruptcy. The trading price of GME reflected this prevailing sentiment, and the financial media was dutifully critical.

Company turnaround

In 2020, activist investor Ryan Cohen began purchasing shares of GME, ultimately becoming the largest individual owner of the company with approximately 12% ownership. By June 2021, the entire board of directors of the company was replaced by Ryan Cohen and his associates, with Ryan Cohen becoming chairman of the board. From this time onward, control of the company was completely in the hands of this new leadership team.

>"We inherited a bunch of legacy everything, and under-investment across the entire business –- people, the entire technology stack, just decades of neglect, and so it’s hard to turn around a brick and mortar retailer that’s under the kind of pressure that GameStop was and continues to be under, but that was also part of the attraction going into GameStop was that a transformation the likes of GameStop was really unprecedented and I was motivated by that."

• Ryan Cohen, November 2022

The company went from a situation where it was losing hundreds of millions of dollars per year to net profitability in fiscal year 2023.

While this is an undeniably positive result for the company in this time period, GameStop continues to face numerous challenges and must continue to improve and adapt in order to successfully compete in the modern video game industry.

Media sentiment

What does mainstream financial media have to say about GameStop achieving full-year profitability for the first time in 6 years?

• GameStop faces 'unsustainable' sales decline, cuts jobs to control costs

  • Focuses on job cuts, reduced revenue, leans on the opinion of Michael Pachter
  • Fails to mention GameStop achieving full-year profitability

• GameStop Q4 Earnings Highlights: Retail Favorite Stock Plunges After Revenue, EPS Miss

  • Emphasis on GME share price going down
  • Focuses on reduced revenue
  • Did mention some favorable facts
  • Fails to mention GameStop achieving full-year profitability

• GameStop Stock Plummets Following Q4: Profitability Fails to Offset Significant Revenue Miss

  • Headline emphasizes GME share price is down
  • Makes clear that GameStop achieved full-year profitability for the first time in years
  • Generally fair reporting of other facts

• GameStop Stock Plunges After Earnings Fall Short of Expectations—Key Level to Watch

  • Headline emphasizes GME share price is down, 'expectations' were missed
  • Focus on job cuts, reduced revenue
  • Fails to mention GameStop achieving full-year profitability

• Jim Cramer Says GameStop Is Arguably The Worst Company In America

  • Article is entirely negative, leans on the opinions of Jim Cramer and Michael Pachter
  • Fails to mention GameStop achieving full-year profitability

• GameStop Q4 Earnings Smash Wall Street Expectations: Reports Profitability For First Time In Over Half A Decade

  • Makes clear and emphasizes contextual significance of GameStop's full-year profitability
  • Generally positive about GameStop's financial circumstances

• GameStop could be gone in less than 5 years, says analyst

  • Article is almost entirely negative, leans on the opinions of Michael Pachter
  • Does mention GameStop's positive cash holdings of $1.2 billion
  • Claims that Reddit's WallStreetBets has 'seemingly walked away from the “stonk”', fails to mention that GME discussion is censored on WallStreetBets (formally banned by the moderators in 2022), fails to mention that GME shareholders are found in different online communities
  • Fails to mention GameStop achieving full-year profitability

• GameStop Needs To Get Its Game Back

  • Focuses on reduced revenue, job cuts
  • Weak mention of GameStop posting a full-year profit of $6.7 million
  • Generally fair assessment of the struggles faced by GameStop

• GameStop Confirms More Layoffs, Share Price Tumbles After Sales Slide

  • Headline emphasizes job cuts, GME share price is down
  • Generally neutral article
  • Does mention GameStop's full-year profitability

• A Sales Slump Is the Kiss of Death for GameStop Stock

  • Entirely negative article, leans on the opinion of Michael Pachter
  • Fails to mention GameStop achieving full-year profitability
  • 'If you value your wealth, just stay away from GameStop stock.'

• GameStop saga ends. Winner: capital markets

  • Entirely negative article, leans on the opinion of Michael Pachter
  • Focuses on GME share price being down
  • Fails to mention GameStop achieving full-year profitability
  • 'In this case, “shorts” were right... The meme army may have lost, but perhaps next time will be clearer-eyed.'

• GameStop Stock: Is This The End of a Saga Or Just Another Chapter?

  • Despite any sentiment implied by the headline, this article provides a mostly neutral assessment of GameStop's circumstances
  • Mentions GameStop achieving full-year profitability

Searching for recent news about GameStop yields mostly negative sentiment that fails to even mention at all that GameStop achieved full-year profitability for the first time in 6 years.

Failing to mention this important detail is a deliberate decision that reveals a clear bias in the media. It goes beyond just reporting about true negative facts about GameStop. It demonstrates a deliberate effort, by those culpable writers and media outlets, to propagate a specific sentiment about the company that is not allowed to even mention contextually important true positive facts about the company.

GameStop was profitable for the first time in 6 years - this is the news headline that captures the significance of GameStop's recent earnings report. Yet, an unassuming person who consumes mainstream financial media likely would not even learn about this important fact at all.

Who would benefit from that?

Ongoing financial conflict

Why are there competing, mutually exclusive narratives?

There are competing narratives because there are competing financial interests.

One of the listed news articles, GameStop saga ends. Winner: capital markets, from Reuters, draws some attention to this ongoing conflict while declaring that the conflict is actually over and one side has won and one side has lost.

GME shareholders that believe in the company turnaround and leadership, despite the real challenges faced by GameStop, have a vested financial interest in the success of the company, with a desire for the share price of GME to go up, and naturally will promote the narrative that supports this financial interest.

In opposition to GME shareholders are all of the financial market participants that have a vested financial interest in the share price of GME going down. An example of such a participant would be any hedge fund that has a net short position on GME. The article refers to this faction as "shorts", recogonizing that such a faction with an interest does exist. Naturally, members of this faction will promote the narrative that supports their financial interest.

If the prospect of GameStop's success was not an ongoing threat to one faction of incumbent market participants, then there would be no reason to deliberately omit the fact of GameStop's profitability, to pretend that it isn't something that even happened at all.

Recognizing that there is an ongoing financial competition between factions that stand to benefit financially from a particular outcome of the GME share price, which faction benefits when most mainstream financial media articles propagate negative sentiment about GameStop and deliberately ignore the contextually significant fact that GameStop was profitable?

It is clear: much of mainstream financial media is actively propagating biased narratives to the benefit of the faction that has a vested financial interest in the share price of GME going down.

An interactive version of this article can be found at gmetimeline.org/fy23-profitability

Date:

May, 28th 2024

What:

"We will transition in the United States (edit: this also includes Canada and Mexico) to securities settlements of T+1 on May 28, 2024."

Sauce:

https://web.archive.org/web/20240202005744/https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-speech-prepared-remarks-european-commission-012524

Originally Proposed Here:

https://web.archive.org/web/20230402142313/http://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/06/2023-03566/shortening-the-securities-transaction-settlement-cycle

On the Original Proposal, an org commented this:

"The commenter expressed concern that moving to T+1 would reduce the time available for a bona fide market maker too close out fail-to-deliver positions and could adversely impact the liquidity role those market makers provide."

To which the SEC included this citation:

Under Regulation SHO's bona fide market making exceptions, the broker-dealer generally should be holding itself out as standing ready and willing to buy and sell the security by continuously posting widely accessible quotes that are near or at the market. The market maker must be at economic risk for such quotes.

“Broker-dealers that do not publish continuous quotations, or publish quotations that do not subject the broker-dealer to such risk (quotations that are not publicly accessible, are not near or at the market, or are skewed directionally towards one side of the market) would not be eligible for the bona-fide market-maker exceptions under Regulation SHO. In addition, broker-dealers that publish quotations but fill orders at different prices than those quoted would not be engaged in bona-fide market making for purposes of Regulation SHO.”). Thus, a market-maker that continually executed short sales away from its posted quotes would generally be unable to rely on the bona-fide market making exceptions of Regulation SHO.

Further, broker-dealers that publish quotations but fill orders at different prices than those quoted would not be engaged in bona fide market-making for purposes of Regulation SHO. The market-maker must also be engaged in bona fide market making in that security at the time of the short sale for eligibility for the exceptions.

I encourage you to look at what all of these orgs also commented (however the one above is certainly the most damning):

Better Markets Letter Fidelity Letter IIAC Letter LaBree Letter MMI Letter Robinson 1 Letter Ryan 1 Letter Stauts Letter letter from Tate Winter (Feb. 17, 2022) (“Winter Letter”)

TIL holding a stock for literally years is "day trading". 🙄

Paul – per your request, I emailed you questions to your corporate account. These questions are from http://WhyDRS.org and various investor communities online. I believe Kevin will be sending you additional questions based on his specific concerns.

Thanks to everyone who submitted public questions, and to those who helped gather and organize them. For public review, here is what we sent Paul Conn, President, Computershare Global Capital Markets:

__________________________________________________ Paul,

Thank you for the opportunity to send general DRS questions. We wanted to send along this list of questions and reopen communication. Much of it is similar to the list of questions sent last year, but we've since answered some and come up with plenty of new ones. It was very nice to see you meeting criticism and concerns from some community members head on over the last week, and that's part of why we're reaching out now. We believe that investors choose to levy such accusations and air out their theories because they are passionate about ownership and want to know the truth. These theories can come from a lack of understanding and a drought of good information with strong citation. Hope we can connect and earnestly tackle this situation, and help everyone get to a more learned place. To start, here’s some context as to why investors are so concerned and curious.

We understand that you cannot answer specific questions on individual stocks, but we think it would be helpful to provide you (and others) a little context as to why investors are so concerned and curious before we list the questions. Approximately 25% of GameStop Corp.’s ($GME) outstanding shares have been registered with their transfer agent (Computershare) for over a year now. While it's possible that there is an innocent macroeconomic explanation for this consistently reported number, GameStop investors and all investors who are driven by a desire to own their investment via DRS want to know more about alternative explanations. Investors have noted anomalous trading volume, particularly on or around the dates for which GameStop reports registered shares (DRS and DirectStock plan shares). Most of $GME’s outstanding shares are accounted for by mutual funds, ETF’s, other funds, insiders, and DRS and plan shares, so it’s odd when 20-25% of the outstanding shares trade in a single day (or a couple days). It’s even more curious when the volume spikes near the DRS record dates.

It’s possible these large spikes in volume are related to illegal options trading used to avoid complying with close-out requirements under RegSHO (see August 9, 2013 SEC Risk Alert https://sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/options-trading-risk-alert.pdf). While this is outside the purview of Computershare, there are concerns that a portion of the $GME shares held by Computershare, Computershare subsidiaries, nominees, etc. may be associated with these options trades via lending or as locates. It's with this context in mind that we'd appreciate your weighing in once again and providing some of your thoughts regarding not GME specifically but the ownership nuances within the current system.

You and other industry experts and veterans have provided many hours of your time to altruistically try and meet the needs of a newly emergent base of activated and curious retail investors. However, there is an ongoing confusion and request for clarity and to that end we've prepared an index of terms/definitions in order to confirm we're using industry terms with shared understanding and then several more in depth questions that speak to remaining uncertainties DRS enthusiasts have. Please refer to the Appendix for these terms. We would like to be deliberate about the terms used. Any industry terms should be individually defined in context and in the view of the person using the term.

We’ve gathered questions from several online investor communities. A dialog back and forth discussing the questions and making sure all questions and answers are thorough, in order to address the speculation and concerns of retail investors would be ideal. Considering the recent / ongoing theories and allegations regarding the degree to which Computershare has lagged on providing clarifying information in the investor communities. Answering these questions will put many investors as well as their speculation at ease and show that Computershare is committed to maintaining transparency and investor trust.

Key Questions: Ownership Structure

1. Some investors have started using the term ‘Sole Legal Title’ to refer to an investor who owns shares in their own name exclusively, on the issuer ledger, without any other entities involved (no nominees, no custodians, etc). ‘Pure DRS’ holdings would represent ‘Sole Legal Title’ while owning shares through a Plan or in an IRA with a custodian would not. Is there a better /more official term for this kind of ownership? An SEC bulletin uses the phrase ‘DRS Form’.

2. Who is the named owner on the share ledger for shares held at the DTC for Operational Efficiency? Is it Computershare’s nominee, DTC’s nominee, or someone else? It is understood that the investor will still be listed by name in a subclass.

3. Can you explain in detail exactly how the holding works for Plan shares held at the DTC? Are those shares considered "non-investor owned"? If so, what does that mean exactly? Are non-investor shares mutually exclusive with other holding types? What are the actual account types that CS uses to interface with the DTCC with for DRS purposes?

4. Which of the following descriptions would you say best describes Plan shares held with DTC for operational efficiency purposes: “held by Cede & Co on behalf of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation” OR “held by registered holders with the transfer agent”

5. Please clearly describe the location and settlement process for a market order for shares in the DirectStock plan vs a company sponsored DSP (such as DepotDirect). What is different about how these shares, once settled, are recorded on the issuer’s ledger?

6. Can you describe the possible chains of custody and ownership for shares in various holding types including Pure DRS and DirectStock such as: custodians, omnibus bulk owners, nominees, Computershare subsidiaries, including what account types are used to manage each. In addition, could you describe the way names appear on the ledger in each of these cases? Ex: “Pure DRS”, plan holdings only, mix of both, shares held in subclass, beneficial ownership outside of DTC, etc.

7. Currently, the common understanding is that Dingo & Co is a nominee used by Computershare for investors in DirectStock to enable features such as fractional shares and fungible bulk holdings. Individual investors names are listed as a subclass, which are on the issuer ledger under the name Dingo & Co. This is a form of beneficial ownership, but is not street name ownership, as shares purchased or through plan are removed from the DTC. Is this an accurate description of ownership structure?

8. Does Computershare or its subsidiaries have more than one nominee which holds shares?

9. In June 2023, the SEC’s OIEA and FINRA released bulletins (excerpts below) certifying that investors who purchased through plan and wished to hold shares directly on the issuer ledger needed to transfer those shares from plan to DRS. The CS FAQ uses similar language. Both Plan and DRS investors appear named on the issuer ledger. Could you describe the process of the Plan -> DRS transfer described here, and how the ownership record changes as a result?

10. “According to FINRA, the SEC, and Computershare: Purchases made through the issuer (or its transfer agent) of securities you intend to hold in direct registration are usually executed under the guidelines of the issuer’s stock purchase plan. You’ll need to instruct the transfer agent to move the securities to the DRS.” https://finra.org/investors/insights/know-the-facts-direct-registered-shares “Purchases made through the issuer (or its transfer agent) of securities you intend to hold in DRS are usually executed under the guidelines of an issuer’s stock purchase plan, which uses a broker-dealer to execute the orders. Thus, to hold in DRS once the securities are acquired, you would need to instruct the transfer agent to move the securities from the issuer plan to DRS.”

https://sec.gov/about/reports-publications/investor-publications/holding-your-securities-get-the-facts “Purchases made through the issuer (or its transfer agent) of securities you intend to hold in direct registration are usually executed under the guidelines of the issuer’s stock purchase plan. You’ll need to instruct the transfer agent to move the securities to the DRS.” https://computershare.com/us/becoming-a-registered-shareholder-in-us-listed-companies

10. With DirectStock enabled, a user enters a principal-agency relationship with Computershare. Can you explain the principal-agency relationship Computershare has with an account holder? https://cda.computershare.com/Content/7bfc0b25-4836-40a4-918c-9a86d658d798

11. When Shares are transferred from a brokerage to a Computershare account, only whole shares can be transferred and documents from computershare say “DTC Stock Withdrawals (DRS)”. Are shares purchased through DRP/DSPP also “DTC Stock Withdrawals (DRS)”, but withdrawn to Computershare’s nominee rather than the investor?

12. If the reported DRS totals for an issuer for the last 5 quarters straight are consistent (within rounding of ~100k shares), what are some possible explanations for why this might be?

13. Is it possible any quantity of registered shares are not being counted in the total reported to the company for any reason? (plan designated, DRS shares, fractionals, "operational efficiency", etc) Per CS FAQ, issuers are provided Plan and Book holdings tallies separately.

14. If an investor has a Computershare Investor Center account that's holding shares of designation "Book", does enrolling that account in the DirectStock Plan have any effect on who holds title to those shares? Specifically, do they remain DRS (DRS Form/Pure DRS), or do those shares become held in the Plan? Does it matter the method by which the account is enrolled (such as: plan purchase, DRIP activation, or setting a limit sell order)?

15. If an investor is enrolled in the DirectStock plan, are all the shares (DRS and plan) in their account considered plan-enrolled shares per the Computershare FAQ?

16. Some of Computershare’s online customer service representatives have stated that Dingo & Co was nominee for plan shares for multiple companies, but Dingo & Co has only been found listed in a small number of filings such as proxy for MGE Energy or bankruptcy filings for SOUTHERN FOODS GROUP, LLC. How do investors find more information on Dingo & Co and their function?

Operational Efficiency (OE)

17. Is Computershare (or their subsidiary, nominee, or chosen broker dealer) compensated by the DTC, the Issuer, or any other third party for maintaining operational efficiency?

18. In the May 2, 2023 update video you appeared in, you said “typically we would hold somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of the shares that underpin the plan through our broker at DTC” and that “we need to maintain a small portion of the inventory at DTC so that we can have effective settlement.” Can you define ‘underpin’ and ‘the plan’? Is the "whole" all shares of a given security owned by accounts enrolled in the DirectStock plan?

19. How could an investor of a given security learn the exact number of shares kept with DTC for OE% by Computershare on a given date?

20. Are shares of any given security owned by accounts enrolled in the DirectStock plan maintained in fungible bulk and held by Computershare’s nominee?

21. Near the end of the 5/2/23 YouTube video “An update on Fractional and Plan Shares”, you said there was a "mischaracterization" of the problem online. What did you mean?

22. Computershare states on the FAQ that they determine the portion used for OE - how is that ratio determined, and how often is it recalculated? Is it a function of a market condition such as volume, price, or something else? Is there a way for investors to track how many shares are allotted for OE?

23. Are the claims made on Shareholder Service Solutions about DirectStock on this page correct, specifically regarding the cost to issuers who are interested in DirectStock? https://shareholderservicesolutions.com/news-item/online-only-direct-stock-purchase-plans-from-computershare/

24. You have stated in the past that DTCC typically holds 10%-20% of plan shares for operational efficiency. What about in atypical situations - How often and how far does OE% stray from the 10-20% range? Has any individual equity risen above that mentioned threshold, and what’s the highest percentage that an equity has ever experienced?

25. Does operational efficiency negatively impact the continuous holder requirement, as required for items like shareholder appraisal rights?

26. Are DRS designated shares pulled into the plan when DRP/DSPP (DirectStock) is enabled, or are only Plan designated shares affected by enrollment?

Reporting

27. Does Computershare directly provide issuers with a total account of issued shares, broken down by record holder, totaling up to shares outstanding? Is this data available to the issuer in real time through the Issuer Online portal?

28. Under what circumstances (if any) would DRS shares held with Computershare for which Cede & Co is not the registered holder be held at the DTC?

29. Under what circumstances (if any) would Plan shares held with Computershare for which Cede & Co is not the registered holder be held at the DTC?

30. Can you confirm if there are currently any ongoing corrections or dispute resolutions involving Direct Registration transactions, specifically using the '396 (Direct Registration Reclaim DK-Without Memo Seg)' code, that have impacted reportable DRS numbers in any stock significantly?

31. Could you provide details on how the application of the '396' transaction code for Direct Registration Reclaim DK-Without Memo Seg activities is being monitored to ensure the integrity of DRS numbers?

32. What procedures are in place to review and approve transactions under the '396 (Direct Registration Reclaim DK-Without Memo Seg)' code, and how are these documented in the context of DRS reporting?

33. Has computershare seen any significant volume increase in Delivery Orders marked with codes 391 or 396 around significant DRS reporting dates for any of its issuers?

34. Could you speculate as to why an issuer might choose to adjust the language in their 10Q/K of the way they report DRS totals, or what a change in language could imply? For example, if an issuer reported DRS shares as “directly registered” for almost two years and then changed the language to “registered” alone.

FRACTIONAL SHARES

35. Is it possible to be the sole legal title holder of a fractional share, meaning no other entities other than the investor are involved in the ownership of that fractional share?

36. Are fractional shares entitled to cast votes? Is this issuer dependent?

OTHER

37. Why does the issuer name come up on bank statements when purchasing through DirectStock?

38. Multiple French companies provide various benefits to “pure registered” shareholders, for example L’Oreal awarding an increased dividend payment. Does Computershare offer U.S. issuers the option to provide benefits like this? Does Computershare offer these benefits in other countries?

39. Computershare has indicated in the FAQ that it is up to individual issuers to disclose shares in DSPP in their tally of directly registered shares, and that such a disclosure may be subject to legislation and regulation. Could you direct us to the relevant legislation and regulation?

40. Between Feb 24 and March 20 of 2023 there was a change made to CS FAQ involving the maximum limit sell order amount reduction in 2022, citing the risk cap of the broker. The limit was changed again around Feb 22 of 2023 to 7x the price of the security. Why was this language removed from the FAQ? It would seem plausible to remove that if 7x the current security price is within the brokers tolerance, but it also had specifically mentioned that this change was made because of 2 specific securities who had >7x their price in 2021 from 2020.

41. Does Computershare have any input as to the language used in financial disclosures for DRS ownership (GME / AMC) or do they provide the holdings data alone?

42. Computershare organizes recurring purchases for hundreds of stocks through various Plans, and specifically with DirectStock Computershare operates a predictable recurring market buy. Does Computershare profit (through PFOF or otherwise) through the provision of this market data and activity to its broker partners?

43. Do you feel that a recurring and predictable schedule for recurring buys creates an issue for recurring buyers? Predictable price movement can lead to arbitrage opportunities and can result in worse outcomes for plan participants in terms of dollars invested/shares owned.

44. Who, besides DTCC, can see ownership records of DTC members at the DTCC?

45. When participants log into the FAST system at the DTCC for DRS functionality, can they see anything about shares that the DTCC holds? The user manual for the FAST system has a DRS section but it is only a couple of pages with some screenshots, not granular data.

46. What are the effects of a “Chill” on DRS transactions?

47. What is Computershare’s regulatory requirement in reporting possible crime if you notice problems or discrepancies?

48. What are the effects of a Stop Trade designation on an account that holds either only Plan, only DRS, or both Plan and DRS shares?

49. Several investors with multiple Computershare logins have reported that placing a stop trade restriction on a single account is blocking their ability to login to all accounts. Should this be happening and if not, how can they get this resolved?

50. Certificated shares may be enrolled into "DirectStock plan", but they are labeled "not available". Can you clarify what "not available" means in that regard?

51. Is there a cost to an issuer for offering Computershare's QuickCert paper certificate service to their investors, by which Investors can pay $25 each to certificate their shares?

52. When a Transfer Agent and the DTCC disagree on the cause of a share discrepancy what is the share reconciliation process? How long do these instances take to resolve, and what is the largest instance of this happening to your knowledge?

Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. As the largest transfer agent for U.S. markets, we hope to continue this journey of transparency and understanding with you.

Sincerely,

The WhyDRS Team and Various Investor Communities

APPENDIX - Terms Book Entry - All electronically tracked and uncertificated shares are considered book-entry shares. Book Holdings - Shares labeled ‘Book’ on the Computershare Investor Center UI Plan Holdings - Shares labeled ‘Plan’ on the Computershare Investor Center UI Pure DRS - An investor center account with 0 Plan holdings and is not enrolled in DirectStock DirectStock - Proprietary Computershare plan structure. Not sponsored or administered by the issuer. Investors will be listed on the share ledger in a subclass under Computershare’s nominee - this is technically a type of beneficial ownership. Plan - A Plan allows investors to facilitate purchase of shares through the Transfer Agent’s interface. This can involve market purchases or can involve sale directly from the issuer. DSP (Direct Stock Plan) - from what we can find, this is clearly defined by the SECand involves direct purchase from the issuer and special issuance of shares. DSPP (Direct Stock Purchase Plan) - Not clearly defined by the SEC, but DirectStock is described as one and involves recurrent purchase at the market through Computershare broker partner. Chain of Custody - A reflection of ownership rights through different market participants, tracing from legal holder to the ultimate beneficial owner at the other. EX: Investor>Broker>Cede and Co On the Ledger / Registered holder - Registered holders, per CS FAQ, are listed by name on the company register. This would include both ‘Pure DRS’ investors along with ‘Plan’ investors. Legal Title Ownership - An investor has legal claim to the underlying asset, and may share that claim with other entities. Sole Legal Title Ownership - An investor is the only entity with legal claim. Operational Efficiency - The process of keeping a portion of the fungible bulk of plan shares with a broker partner (with DTC) in order to facilitate quicker and more efficient settlement. Underpin - We’d like a better definition for this. You used this word to describe the shares which are involved with the DirectStock Plan. Nominee - Entity in which securities are kept in order to facilitate transactions more smoothly. Custodian - When a firm is holding an investment on behalf of a client for safekeeping Omnibus - The pooling of investments from multiple individuals under an entity such as a nominee. Fungible Bulk - A description of shares kept in an omnibus. Fungible bulk shares are indistinguishable from each other and can be drawn down against the total without impacting the listed holdings of any participant. Dingo & Co - Listed as Computershare’s nominee on an MGE Energy Proxy Filing. Does it also act as Computershare’s nominee for other plan structures? Computershare Trust Co NA - A DTC Member and broker subsidiary of Computershare. Manages the sales facility, and when a limit sell order is placed, shares will be transferred to Plan designation under this section of Computershare. Chill/Freeze : A method of preventing transactions from occurring on specific shares or a CUSIP involved in a corporate action. When shares are chilled, they cannot be moved. This list of terms is not exhaustive, and so if you can think of any terms which are commonly misunderstood or confused, we'd appreciate your adding them.

This rule change (approved by the SEC) prevents issuers (such as GameStop) from withdrawing their shares from the DTC.

> Recently a number of issuers of securities have independently requested that DTC withdraw from the depository all securities issued by them.

> As explained in further detail by many of the commenters opposing DTC's proposal, the issuers making these requests have alleged that their securities have been the target of manipulative short sellers.

> DTC's proposed rule change provides that upon receipt of a withdrawal request from an issuer, DTC will take the following actions: > > (1) DTC will issue an Important Notice notifying its participants of the receipt of the withdrawal request from the issuer and reminding participants that they can utilize DTC's withdrawal procedures if they wish to withdraw their securities from DTC; and > > (2) DTC will process withdrawal requests submitted by participants in the ordinary course of business but will not effectuate withdrawals based upon a request from the issuer."

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Prior to stumbling into the GME saga and starting to draw pictures about it on the regular, I drew a lot of line patterns that recombined with each other to form interconnecting patterns. The largest set of these drawings being an alphabet and number set that aligned to make patterns when words and sentences were compiled. I made that into a computer font I called “The Alphabetter!”, that I wanted to NFT and someday sell on the GME marketplace. Alas.

However, these interconnecting patterns take longer to draw because I do it all by hand and have to make sure that most lines in one picture have a place to align with in the adjacent panel(s) depending on the arrangement, so when I was drawing one pic a week for The Stonk I didn’t have enough time to get fancy. But since moving to a pic every 2 weeks, that’s given me the time to do it up!

So these two panels can be read a few ways, there’s the usual thick-lined-easy-find, but there’s also a more hidden thin lined set of words in there. The panels were drawn so they would recombine both horizontally and vertically, so they could be copied and pasted adjacent to each other up, down, and side to side, and still align the words both ways, as demonstrated in the animated gif versions posted here.

So while the FUD flows free and shills question the lack of guidance, or the missing of inflated targets, or the acumen of the executive suite..., for me this previous week of post-earnings FUD has shown in the comments that there are STILL just under 200,000 DRS’s badasses who are not only holding strong, but continuing the grind, and like myself they keep buying a few and DRS’ing, they still remember the insane touchstones of this bonkers saga, they still don’t give out financial advice but are still willing to help new apes just showing up. I am glad that we’re so immune to the bullshit now, that this train will not get knocked off the tracks, and that it may take time, but we WILL lock the float and then sit back to watch the fumbling explanations, the law breaking underhandedness, the finger pointing, the excuses, and the bold-faced-lies in the media. And then we’ll get paid. And then we’ll start fixing the shit the system was too corrupted to fix.

Let’s Fucking GO!

Own your own shit, make sure you book!

If there is "NO" difference, why not err on the side of caution, and book them anway ;)

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For added reading, I can't be the only one who remembers when this came to light and was instantly removed by the mods?

GODS OF THE SUN, part 1.2 - Manipulating the meme stock narrative, RC’s “Sears” tweet, Vulture Funds, Apollo Global Management, who Adam Aron really is, Epstein, Goldman Sachs, and the TOTAL ECLIPSE of the SUN. (Wow, eh?)

Billionaire Leon Black is leaving Apollo following scrutiny over ties to Jeffrey Epstein

APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT is the "Private" Private Equity firm that handles a tone of FUD for shorts and market manipulators thru their very popular platform "Yahoo Finance"... Apollo is a big player in this short and distort GME saga...

Hmmmm, I wonder if that has anything to do w/ Yahoo Finance having the wrong info here for THREE YEARS?

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Rate cuts were a great idea and I'm sure you weren't struggling prior to these monetary policies.

Baltimore Bridge Collapse Reverberates From Cars to Coal

Biden vows federal support to rebuild after accident with ship Disaster adds new pressure on already strained supply chains

By Nacha Cattan, Heather Perlberg, and Brendan Murray March 26, 2024 at 5:32 PM CDT Updated on March 27, 2024 at 12:49 PM CDT

The 1.6 mile-long bridge collapsed in a matter of seconds. The catastrophic consequences are set to stretch out for weeks.

As much as 2.5 million tons of coal, hundreds of cars made by Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Co., and lumber and gypsum are threatened with disruption after the container ship Dali slammed into and brought down Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge in the early hours of Tuesday.

Six people were presumed dead after a search in the Patapsco River, officials said. The toll could have been far worse except for a mayday call from the Singaporean-flagged vessel as it lost power.

A major commuter bridge in Baltimore collapsed after being struck by a container ship, causing vehicles to plunge into the water.

Authorities are still looking for up to seven people who are believed to be in the water https://t.co/lMbm5w0u6m pic.twitter.com/eCSwA1hOGT — Bloomberg TV (@BloombergTV) March 26, 2024

The aftermath of the bridge’s collapse throws another spotlight on the fragile nature of global supply chains that have already been strained by drought in Panama and missile attacks on Red Sea shipping by Yemen-based Houthi militants. Docks in New Jersey and Virginia face the threat of being overwhelmed by traffic that’s being forced away from Baltimore, one of the busiest ports on the US East Coast.

“It’s a large port with a lot of flow through it, so it’s going to have an impact,” John Lawler, Ford’s chief financial officer, told Bloomberg TV. “We’ll work on the workarounds. We’ll have to divert parts to other ports along the East Coast or elsewhere in the country.” Six Presumed Dead After Baltimore Bridge Collapse 4:59 WATCH: The impact of the Baltimore bridge collapse will be felt for months. Kailey Leinz and Michael McKee report.

Baltimore only handled about 3% of all East Coast and Gulf Coast imports in the year through Jan. 31, said S&P Global Market Intelligence. But it’s crucial to cars and light trucks, with European carmakers such as Mercedes-Benz Group AG, Volkswagen AG and BMW operating facilities in and around the port. It’s also the second-largest terminal for US exports of coal, with a shutdown potentially hitting shipments to India.

Read more: Baltimore Bridge Collapse Could Block Coal Exports for Weeks

About a dozen large vessels are stuck inside Baltimore’s harbor as well as a similar number of tug boats, according to IHS Markit and Wood Mackenzie’s Genscape. The list includes cargo ships, automobile carriers and a tanker named the Palanca Rio. Port of Baltimore Closed Indefinitely After Bridge Collapse

Cargo ships and most of Baltimore’s shipping infrastructure are trapped behind the downed Key Bridge, except for the Tradepoint Atlantic Terminal

Sources: IHS Markit; Wood Mackenzie/Genscape; Port of Baltimore Directory; Maryland Port Administration; Maryland Department of Transportation; Google Earth

Note: Ship locations as of 10 a.m. US East Coast time. Tugboats, patrol boats and buoy tenders not mapped.

That’s just the impact on the port.

About 35,000 people used the bridge every day. The annual value of goods going over is about $28 billion, according to the American Trucking Associations.

“We rely on our infrastructure systems for our daily needs, for a huge amount of the goods that we get in the United States from overseas and to have it cut off so suddenly, it’s a huge crisis,” said Yonah Freemark, a researcher at the Urban Institute.

The Francis Scott Key Bridge, named for the man who wrote the text of the Star-Spangled Banner, took five years to build and was completed in 1977. The cost at the time was around $141 million, according to one estimate. A rebuild today is likely to cost “several billion dollars,” said Freemark.

President Joe Biden said he wants the federal government to pay and vowed “to move heaven and earth to reopen the port and rebuild the bridge.” Read More

Baltimore Bridge Collapse Will Redirect Cargo Across the US

Baltimore Port Closing to Test Shock-Worn Economy: Supply Lines

Vital Baltimore Bridge Collapses After Being Struck by Ship

But Baltimore is in for a lengthy reconstruction. It could be weeks before any port operations resume as officials need to recover missing victims, remove bridge debris and the 984-foot Dali from the river and then reopen the blocked channel.

“This is one of the cathedrals of American infrastructure,” said US Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg. “The path to normalcy will not be easy, it will not be quick, it will not be inexpensive, but we will rebuild together.”

That’s expected to accelerate a shift of cargo to the US West Coast to avoid bottlenecks from Boston to Miami. A sudden 10% to 20% increase in volumes through a port is enough to cause massive backlogs and congestion, according to Ryan Petersen, the founder and chief executive officer of Flexport Inc., a digital freight platform based in San Francisco.

A US Coast Guard helicopter flies over the Dali container vessel in Baltimore, Maryland on March 26.Photographer: Al Drago/Bloomberg

Trade Hub

Traversing Maryland, meanwhile, threatens to create headaches for motorists and truckers. A trip from Edgemere heading south to Glen Burnie was about 15 miles (24 kilometers) over the bridge. It’s 20 miles via the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel. The trip will be even tougher for truckers hauling hazardous materials, which are barred from the tunnel. They’d have to travel 45 miles on the Baltimore Beltway.

The biggest hit though could be to Baltimore itself, a city of close to 600,000 people whose stagnation and high-poverty neighborhoods were made famous by television show The Wire.

The bridge helped connect major parts of Baltimore and was key to its renaissance as a logistics and e-commerce hub after the shuttering of its steel industry. With its deep-water port, shortline railway and well-located interstate highway, the city attracted investors who have been pouring money into redevelopment. Baltimore Bridge Collapse Impact On Coal, Supply Chains 1:58 WATCH: Six people are presumed dead after the collapse of Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge in the early hours of Mar 26. S&P Global Commodity Insights’ Global Head of Shipping Rahul Kapoor explains the potential impact on US coal exports, and supply chains.

One of the largest projects, Tradepoint Atlantic, has leased millions of square feet in warehouse space to some of the world’s biggest businesses, including Amazon.com Inc. and FedEx Corp.

The local president of the International Longshoremen’s Association warned that he has 2,400 ILA members who could soon lose their jobs.

Read more: Baltimore Union Fears Loss of 2,400 Jobs After Bridge Collapse

Facing months of uncertainty, Baltimore and Maryland both declared a state of emergency.

Throughout the morning on Tuesday, crowds gathered in east Baltimore County, camping out in grassy spots or climbing highway guardrails to get a better look of the bridge and snap photos. Across the street from a Dollar General on Dundalk Avenue, residents discussed the roar of the structure collapsing, comparing it to a jet engine during takeoff.

Not far from the collapsed bridge, police changed shifts at the dock of the Hard Yacht Cafe in Dundalk. Officers getting off their boat had been circling the waters as part of the rescue effort for more than 10 hours, they said, adding that divers were searching for remaining victims in the water when they left the scene.

US National Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy said investigators were able to board the Dali Tuesday night to inspect the ship’s bridge, electronics and documentation.

“We do have the data record, which is essentially the ‘black box,’” Homendy said in an interview with CNN. “We’ve sent that back to our lab to evaluate and begin to develop a timeline of events that led up to the strike on the bridge.”

She added that investigators should have information from the vessel’s black box later on Wednesday.

— With assistance from Skylar Woodhouse, Ruth Liao, Millie Munshi, Phil Kuntz, and Josh Eidelson

(Updates with fears of job losses in 20th paragraph.)

Related Reading:

Why Texas Is Banning Banks Over Their ESG Policies

Texas started a war against 'anti-fossil fuel' banks. It could cost taxpayers $22 billion.

UBS Banker’s Frustration Exposes Cracks in World of Climate Finance

The world’s biggest banks are quietly hanging on to carbon-intensive clients because of what they see as unrealistic demands from regulators and civil society — and the threat to their fees. By Alastair Marsh and Natasha White March 27, 2024 at 4:00 PM CDT

Judson Berkey didn’t hold back.

It was early February and the UBS Group AG banker had WebEx-dialed into a meeting held on the 17th floor of the Japanese Financial Services Agency’s building in the Kasumigaseki district of central Tokyo. The closed-door gathering with representatives of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and public officials from around the world was billed as a “check-in” for regulators to ask key market participants how they were dealing with the growing tapestry of rules and guidelines around transitioning the economy away from high-carbon assets.

What might otherwise have been a staid conference took an unexpected turn as Berkey, group head of engagement and regulatory strategy at UBS, interjected. The finance industry was being asked to align loans, investments and capital-markets portfolios with a global warming trajectory of 1.5C, while the planet may in fact be hurtling toward a 2.8C increase from pre-industrial times, he noted. The Financial Services Agency headquarters in Tokyo.Photographer: Akio Kon/Bloomberg

The upshot: The world’s biggest banks can’t live up to the green regulatory ideal unless they start dumping huge numbers of clients worldwide at a reckless pace and also roil economies in large swathes of the globe that primarily rely on dirty fuels. Faced with that dilemma, many lenders are quietly reeling in their climate ambitions.

“Banks are living and lending on planet earth, not planet NGFS,” Berkey told the group in an impassioned speech, alluding to the Network for Greening the Financial System, a collection of central bankers that creates model scenarios for how the energy transition may evolve. Details of what transpired at the meeting hosted by the Financial Stability Board — a coordinator of global regulations — came from people who were in the room but asked not to be named discussing private talks. Berkey confirmed his participation, declining to say more.

The UBS banker’s outburst, which got little pushback from those present, exposes the cracks emerging in a multitrillion-dollar transition finance project, and taps into what’s rapidly becoming one of the most contentious issues in the global banking industry. In private, senior bankers in sustainable finance divisions in London, New York, Toronto and Paris grumble about unrealistic expectations from regulators, civil society and climate activists around the industry’s role in getting the planet to net zero.

The standoff that’s brewing is setting the stage for a showdown at the heart of the ESG movement, where environmental, social and governance considerations are being pitted against old-fashioned capitalism.

As the gatekeepers of capital, banks can play a central role as catalysts for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Private capital will need to cough up the lion’s share of the $5 trillion to $10 trillion in annual commitments needed to pay for the green transition, and according to hedge fund billionaire Bridgewater Associates founder Ray Dalio, that will only happen if there’s “a return on the money.” Adair TurnerPhotographer: Dominika Zarzycka/NurPhoto/Getty Images

Climate change is “an economic externality, and you can’t expect a free market to deal with it voluntarily,” Adair Turner, who ran Britain’s financial regulator during the subprime and euro-zone debt crises and is now chair of the Energy Transitions Commission, said in an interview. Most of the transition away from high-carbon activities toward greener business models “will be financed by private institutions making, broadly speaking, profit-maximizing decisions,” he said.

Banks that had enthusiastically committed to align their entire operations with net zero goals are having second thoughts as the real-world ramifications of acting on those pledges become painfully apparent.

For instance, doing business in the energy sectors of coal-dependent countries like South Africa, Poland and Indonesia would be off limits.

Not only do the commitments make it harder for banks to serve commodities clients like Glencore Plc, but even companies not always associated with heavy carbon footprints are ending up in the crosshairs. Nvidia Corp., the wildly successful tech colossus, has an implied temperature rise of 4C and cosmetics giant L'Oreal SA is at an eye-popping 6C, meaning their business models are currently aligned with a trajectory of devastating global warming, according to data compiled by Morningstar Inc. The Voyager building at Nvidia headquarters in Santa Clara, California.Photographer: Marlena Sloss/Bloomberg

“Our net zero commitments are about being our clients’ lead partner and are consciously taken around the idea that we need to be there with our clients and our clients need to succeed, not that we need to hyper select clients in order to get to net zero somehow faster or better,” Jonathan Hackett, head of sustainable finance at Bank of Montreal, said in an interview.

Some of the world’s biggest lenders, including Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Holdings Plc and Bank of America Corp., are adding caveats to their restrictions on financing coal, the planet’s most-polluting energy source.

BlackRock Inc. Chief Executive Officer Larry Fink says he has stopped using the term ESG and emphasized the world’s largest asset manager's work with energy firms in a letter to investors this week. The firm has scaled back its participation in international climate investing alliances.

In February, a string of financial heavyweights, including JPMorgan Asset Management, Pacific Investment Management Co. and State Street Global Advisors, withdrew from Climate Action 100+, the world’s largest investor group formed to fight global warming. Lenders, including HSBC, decided to withdraw applications to get their climate goals certified by the United Nations-backed Science Based Targets initiative. Other such voluntary climate alliances have been shaken by similar walkouts of late. Fossil Fuel Financiers

Twenty of the world's biggest banks have allocated a total of over $2 trillion in loans to fossil fuels since the Paris Agreement was struck in 2015.

Source: Bloomberg

Spokespeople for the firms said the moves didn’t reflect a reduced commitment to climate finance. Behind the scenes, people close to the decisions to exit point to the inconvenience of continued membership, spanning everything from the risk of being sued by anti-ESG agitators in the US — especially in the event former President Donald Trump returns to the White House — to the growing mountain of paperwork associated with upholding climate targets. There’s also lost revenue.

“For banks with substantial capital markets businesses, like those competing with the JPMorgans of the world, it’s fee income that’s on the line here,” said James Vaccaro, Chief Catalyst at Climate Safe Lending Network, a group that helps the finance industry figure out how to cut its carbon footprint. “Ditching clients off track from 1.5C means losing major lines of revenue.”

When climate consciousness erupted onto the financial stage in 2021 at the so-called COP26 summit in Glasgow, major western banks clamorously committed to reduce their carbon footprints. Financed emissions — those that arise from lending and investing — would fall in line with a pathway to achieve net zero by 2050, they pledged. In tandem, most of them promised to pour a big chunk of money — anywhere between $750 billion and $2.5 trillion per bank — into green and sustainable deals by the end of this decade.

But all that was before they had rolled up their sleeves and done the math. Declarations of intent on slashing greenhouse gas emissions “over projected” what the industry could do, said Adam Matthews, chief responsible investment officer for the Church of England Pensions Board. There’s now a “gradual peeling away of flaky members as the penny has dropped that this is much harder than a photo call and press release,” he said. Adam MatthewsPhotographer: Betty Laura Zapata/Bloomberg

Inside the finance industry, irritation hit a new level after the publication of an ECB paper in January stating that 90% of the euro-zone banks it analyzed are “misaligned” with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5C. The central bank called this a “staggering” outcome.

The ECB noted that many banks depend largely on clients in energy-intensive sectors for revenue. It looked at six industries — power, automotive, oil and gas, steel, coal and cement. On average, these exposures amount to 15% of their highest-quality capital, although the ECB cited “significant variation among banks.” In other words, widespread losses on loans to high-carbon sectors would probably wipe out a large chunk of banks’ financial reserves.

Defining what can go under the rubric of the green transition remains a work-in-progress, even as lenders including Barclays Plc, BNP Paribas SA and Citigroup Inc. create new investment and corporate banking teams for it.

In some cases, banks are even placing the financing of coal plants under an ESG banner. Lenders are looking for ways to hold on to clients in an array of high-emitting industries spanning cement to shipping and aviation. HSBC has made clear that many clients within these industries will only reach net zero if nascent carbon-reduction technologies can be sufficiently scaled up. The Countries Most Reliant on Coal

South Africa, China and India rely on coal for over half of their energy needs.

Source: Energy Institute's Statistical Review of World Energy, 2023

Other includes oil, natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric and other renewable energy sources.

Coal has tended to face the tightest financing restrictions of all fossil fuels, and international packages to help developing countries transition away from coal have struggled to attract western bankers concerned their involvement would breach their climate policies.

Now, some banks are testing the waters.

A January request for proposals from banks to help finance a coal deal linked to one of the so-called Just Energy Transition Partnerships in Indonesia received a “strong response,” a spokesperson for the Asian Development Bank told Bloomberg. HSBC, Standard Chartered Plc and Bank of America are among lenders that have pitched for the deal that would finance the early closure of the Cirebon-1 coal-fired power station in West Java, Bloomberg has reported. The only way the banks can do that is by expanding their exposure to coal in the medium term.

Cirebon is one of hundreds of coal-fired plants that power homes and industry across Asia. Unlike in the US or Europe, many coal plants in Asia are still just a few years into an estimated lifespan of roughly four decades. They’re also locked into long-term power agreements and have investors who expect the returns they were promised when they allocated funds to the plants. So shutting them early comes at a significant financial cost. The fishing village of Waruduwur near a coal-fired power station in Cirebon, Indonesia.Photographer: Muhammad Fadli/Bloomberg

“Getting to net zero in time won't be possible unless we all work together to find ways to finance the credible early retirement of Asia's relatively young coal power assets, even if it looks like our coal-related emissions go up in the short term,” said Celine Herweijer, HSBC's chief sustainability officer. “This is about avoided real world emissions.”

The bank published an updated coal policy in January, which shows it now applies a “risk-based approach” to coal projects that might otherwise have been excluded. Herweijer said there's work under way in the industry to separately account for coal-related emissions if they’re the result of financing credible early-coal retirement initiatives.

But some global banks and investors say continued ties with coal just isn’t worth the risk.

“It’s a bit of a slippery slope,” said Thibaud Clisson, climate lead at BNP Paribas Asset Management. The world needs to “get rid of coal as soon as possible, so at this stage, we don’t want to take this opportunity to be less strict,” he said.

Alice Carr, executive director of public policy at the world’s biggest climate finance coalition, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, or GFANZ, says “financial institutions don’t really want to do these kinds of [early coal retirement] transactions presently because we need the right guardrails and there’s a lot of reputational risk if you don’t get them right.” GFANZ is co-chaired by Mark Carney, who is the chair of Bloomberg Inc.’s board and a former Bank of England governor, and Michael R. Bloomberg, the founder of Bloomberg News parent Bloomberg LP.

For Climate Safe Lending’s Vaccaro, it’s how banks go about it that’s important. The opportunity to pivot to green financing is “big enough” to offset some of the lost revenue of dirty clients, but banks are unlikely to seize it if they continue with their “doublespeak” on both embracing sustainability and maintaining business as usual, he said.

Climate activists are worried. Experience suggests that banks and investors “love nothing better than a good policy loophole,” said Paddy McCully, senior energy transition analyst at French climate nonprofit Reclaim Finance. “If one exists, the chances are high they will pour some money through it.”

Meanwhile, investors sticking with carbon-heavy assets say those staying away risk ignoring the real issues in the wider economy. Fumitaka NakahamaPhotographer: Shoko Takayasu/Bloomberg

Many current policies restricting investment in such companies “create a bias” that hurts emerging markets, according to Diana Guzman, chief sustainability officer at Prudential Plc. “Divestment isn’t going to be the solution,” said Fumitaka Nakahama, group head of global corporate and investment banking at Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.

As they balance the needs of their clients against their green commitments, veterans of global finance say they want regulators to be honest and acknowledge that progress on climate is slow, and that without the right incentives, bankers won’t play the role expected of them.

“It was always convenient for finance to be projected as the savior on climate, when in reality, finance can only go so far if the enabling policy environment isn’t there,” according to the Church of England Pensions Board’s Matthews.

That was the point UBS’s Berkey made during the Tokyo meeting, and according to those who were in the room, when he had finished speaking, everyone could see “the wheels turning” in the regulators’ heads.

— With assistance from Nicholas Comfort

Evidence from the criminal trial of Sam Bankman-Fried suggests fraud was built into FTX from the very beginning.

By Zeke Faux and Max Chafkin March 27, 2024 at 4:00 PM CDT

Sometime between FTX’s collapse and Sam Bankman-Fried’s fraud conviction a year later, a consensus formed about the onetime boy genius of cryptocurrency: His wild, curly hair and beanbag chair naps at the office were largely for show, but his company FTX, which had been used by millions of people to buy and sell digital currencies, was the real deal. The crypto faithful see FTX as an almost-success story—if only its owner hadn’t taken customer money to cover side gambles. As the author Michael Lewis put it on 60 Minutes, “They actually had a great, real business.”

That idea has been bolstered by a twist in the FTX bankruptcy: When the company collapsed, $8 billion in customer funds had vanished, but the lawyers running it now say they expect to recover enough money to pay back everyone in full. Bankman-Fried’s allies have used this to suggest that the customer funds weren’t so much stolen as they were redirected into at least a few surprisingly good investments. “Whatever else might be said about Bankman-Fried, he was a brilliant businessman,” the law professors Ian Ayres and John Donohue wrote in a recent essay arguing he was wrong to even declare bankruptcy. His lawyers have used this argument to call for a light sentence; on March 28 a federal judge will decide whether to go easy on him or send him to prison for 40 years or more, as prosecutors are seeking. Sam Bankman-Fried, co-founder and former chief executive officer of cryptocurrency exchange FTX, at his arraignment hearing in Manhattan federal court in New York on Dec. 22, 2022, in this courtroom sketch.Photographer: Jane Rosenberg/Reuters

Meanwhile, the crypto industry is acting as if nothing went wrong. The price of Bitcoin is near a record high; also booming are so-called memecoins, a neologism referring to tokens that don’t even pretend to have a real business behind them beyond vibes. The bulk of trading still occurs on exchanges located in countries with extra-light regulation. Crypto boosters have even spun Bankman-Fried’s conviction—along with a guilty plea from the former head of the world’s largest exchange, Binance’s Changpeng Zhao, to criminal charges including laundering money for terrorists—as a positive. “We now have an opportunity to start a new chapter,” Brian Armstrong, the chief executive officer of Coinbase Global Inc., wrote on the social network X. In other words: Don’t worry, it’s safe to buy crypto again.

But Bankman-Fried’s case revealed a version of the former billionaire that’s more disturbing—and especially troubling for an industry bent on sweeping the whole episode under the beanbag. According to an examination of trial testimony, thousands of pages of exhibits and interviews with insiders, Bankman-Fried’s rise appeared to rely on tricking customers, investors and banks almost from the very beginning. His genius, if one can call it that, was recognizing that the mania around crypto would enable him to get away with totally disregarding the rules. Bankman-Fried sits near a screen showing him shaking hands with Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao in this courtroom sketch from Oct. 10, 2023.Photographer: Jane Rosenberg/Reuters

Imagine crypto trading as a video game. Bankman-Fried certainly did. His gaming addiction was a running theme throughout Lewis’ bestselling book Going Infinite: The Rise and Fall of a New Tycoon and was well known even to his own investors, who caught him playing League of Legends during a pitch meeting. Helping himself to FTX customer money was like turning on invincible mode. It let him gamble like he’d never lose and spend like he’d never go broke. His race to billionaire status was so fast that one tech blogger compared it to a speedrun of The Legend of Zelda.

Bankman-Fried’s trading wasn’t as profitable before he found his cheat code. Back in 2017, when he started a hedge fund called Alameda Research, he relied on personal connections for funding and even then had to agree to pay punishing interest rates. Bankman-Fried, then 25, had worked at the Wall Street firm Jane Street Capital, but his capital came mostly from people he knew from the effective altruism movement, whose adherents believe getting rich quickly and giving money thoughtfully could help solve the world’s ills.

Alameda’s first big investor was an early Skype engineer named Jaan Tallinn, who charged the hedge fund an annual interest rate of 43%. He and a handful of other wealthy effective altruists lent Alameda more than $100 million. But within a few months, Bankman-Fried had suffered a series of big losses, and many of his investors demanded to be paid back. He somehow still cultivated an image of perpetual success and immense wealth, often with a philanthropic bent. This image had the effect of obscuring an essential truth about his empire: For a business that purported to be wildly profitable, it was weirdly low on cash.

“This was something he talked about a lot,” Caroline Ellison, the former CEO of Alameda, said in her court testimony. “He said that we should be trying really hard to find new sources of money.” Ellison pleaded guilty for the role she played in defrauding customers. Caroline Ellison weeps as she testifies during Bankman-Fried’s trial on Oct. 11, 2023.Photographer: Elizabeth Williams/AP Photo

Until Ellison took the stand, Bankman-Fried’s official story about the founding of FTX had basically stood unchallenged: He started the company in 2019, he often said, because Alameda had been doing a lot of crypto trading, and he thought he could build a better exchange. He pitched FTX to customers as a safe place to buy, sell and store their digital currencies. Ellison offered an alternative explanation: “He said that FTX would be a good source of capital,” she said in court. The implication was that Bankman-Fried started FTX as a means to fund high-risk investments for Alameda. This, to be clear, is the opposite of what he told customers.

Testimony from Bankman-Fried’s former employees, as well as code from FTX’s website introduced as evidence in the trial, showed his pitch to be hollow. For example, the total balance for an “insurance fund” listed on FTX’s website to reassure customers was actually made up using a random number generator. And just months after the exchange opened, FTX created a backdoor for Alameda, a mechanism within FTX’s code known internally as “allow negative.” It overrode FTX’s internal controls, making it possible for Alameda to borrow almost unlimited sums from FTX customers. It also helped that, to deposit money at FTX, customers had to send it to Alameda. They were led to believe the funds would be passed along and held on their behalf. Instead, Alameda in many cases just spent the money.

Bankman-Fried acknowledged most of this at the trial but said none of it was malicious. His former employees on the witness stand, however, suggested he knew the company was short on cash and tried to hide it. FTX co-founder Gary Wang testified that, in late 2019, he overheard his boss telling an Alameda trader it was OK that the fund was borrowing money from FTX customers because the exchange had earned more than enough in trading fees to cover the investments. A few months later, Wang said, he discovered Alameda had already blown through that already questionable guideline. Gary Wang testifies during Bankman-Fried’s trial on Oct. 6, 2023.Photographer: Elizabeth Williams/AP Photo

The truth was obvious to him: “Alameda was taking customers’ money,” Wang testified.

All the evidence makes clear that FTX wasn’t a good company run by a bad guy. It was a business that was crooked almost from Day 1. That’s a problem for the entire crypto market. Its supporters pitch the products as an alternative to a mainstream financial system they say is rigged against ordinary people. But the conditions that let Bankman-Fried rig markets at FTX remain unchanged. If anything, they may get worse: In a contentious political environment, crypto boosters are spending lavishly to influence lawmakers and try to soften regulations while marketing digital tokens as a sensible choice for novice investors. Which is pretty much what Bankman-Fried did to maximize his fraud.

It wasn’t hard for Bankman-Fried, armed with the cheat code of unlimited customer cash, to make FTX look more successful than it actually was. The company famously spent hundreds of millions of dollars on luxury real estate in the Bahamas and made eye-popping investments in crypto companies—including $50 million for a startup that sells digital copies of cartoon monkeys, $45 million for the investment firm run by former Trump White House spokesman Anthony Scaramucci and $400 million for an attempted bailout of a failing crypto lender. Bankman-Fried also spent lavishly on donations to politicians and celebrity endorsements. An Instagram post showing Bankman-Fried with singer Katy Perry.Source: SDNY US Attorney’s Office

More important, perhaps, the cheat code allowed FTX to paper over losses that would’ve sunk a normal business. According to Wang, FTX lost about $1 billion in a 2021 incident when a trader exploited a bug in its software using a thinly traded token called MobileCoin. The loss would’ve wiped out all the revenue the exchange had generated since it started, according to internal figures filed as evidence in court, and might’ve sent a version of FTX that wasn’t cheating straight into bankruptcy. Instead, Bankman-Fried instructed employees to count the loss as Alameda’s.

At the trial, Wang recalled Bankman-Fried’s explanation: “He said that FTX’s balance sheets are more public than Alameda’s.” In an interview with Bloomberg Opinion columnist Matt Levine several months after the MobileCoin incident, Bankman-Fried bragged that the company’s risk management was so good that “we’ve never had a day, I think, that there was more money that we lost in blowouts to revenue than trading fees.” This was a lie. A court image shows Bankman-Fried at his desk at FTX.Source: SDNY US Attorney’s Office

Around the same time, Bankman-Fried was negotiating with venture capitalists to raise money for FTX. He sent them reports that omitted the giant loss. “Congrats on the amazing exchange performance,” Zack Rosen of Ribbit Capital wrote in response to Bankman-Fried’s pitch. In July 2021, FTX raised $900 million. A former employee involved with the investment, who asked not to be identified because of the company’s ongoing litigation, says the deal would never have closed if Bankman-Fried hadn’t covered up the loss.

Even with the influx of venture capital, Alameda borrowed more and more from FTX. One of the big costs was buying out an investment that Binance had made in FTX so Bankman-Fried could disentangle his company from a rival. “We don’t really have the money for this,” Ellison testified that she told Bankman-Fried.

“That’s OK,” Bankman-Fried replied, according to Ellison. “We have to get it done.” Ellison testified that they used an additional $1 billion of FTX customer deposits to close the deal with Binance. Ellison points out Bankman-Fried during his fraud trial on Oct. 10, 2023.Photographer: Jane Rosenberg/Reuters

Later that year, as crypto markets boomed, Alameda borrowed even more to make big bets on newly minted digital currencies known within the industry as “shitcoins.” As Ellison once put it in a post on Twitter, “figure out when the market is going to go up and get balls long before that.” Alameda was also investing in so-called yield farming, which in practice often amounted to lending money to Ponzi schemes and hoping to get out before they collapsed. There also was a $150 million expense Ellison listed as “the thing” on a report she prepared. The thing, prosecutors alleged, was “one of the largest foreign bribes ever paid by a US person,” in this case to Chinese government officials.

In mid-2021, before Bankman-Fried’s spending spree really got going, Ellison warned him that Alameda’s debts were looking risky. Bankman-Fried asked her to invest an additional $3 billion in venture capital, even though Alameda had already helped itself to at least $2 billion from FTX customers and borrowed $9 billion from other lending firms. The hedge fund’s biggest asset was a giant pile of cryptocurrencies that Bankman-Fried had either created himself or was closely associated with. Ellison calculated that without these so-called Sam coins, FTX owed almost $3 billion more than it had. She testified telling Bankman-Fried that if they made the investments, and the market crashed and lending firms asked for their money back, Alameda would go broke and FTX would fail.

What happened next is, well, they made the investments, the market crashed, Alameda went broke and FTX failed. Before long, Bahamian police were knocking on the door of Bankman-Fried’s $30 million penthouse.

After FTX filed for bankruptcy, Bankman-Fried didn’t know what to do. He wrote a list of potential strategies, including: “File the doc with problems about the Chapter 11 process” (Option 1); “go on Tucker Carlsen [sic]” and “come out against the woke agenda” (Option 3); “Have Michael Lewis interview me” (Option 11); “radical honesty” (Option 15). Ultimately he settled on a version of Option 1, blaming the bankruptcy attorneys, and Option 11, finding a sympathetic journalist. He didn’t try Option 15.

Bankman-Fried first said he lost the money through a series of sloppy mistakes. He claimed he wasn’t heeding warning signs because it felt like he had “infinity dollars.” “I f---ed up,” he wrote on Twitter and in testimony he planned to deliver to Congress. Then, in interviews and social media posts, he complained he’d been victimized by “strong-arming” lawyers who’d manipulated him into filing for bankruptcy, which he called “maybe my single biggest f---up.” In a series of unpublished essays titled “Inception,” after the Christopher Nolan movie, he even argued that Sullivan & Cromwell, the law firm in charge of the FTX bankruptcy, had manufactured the narrative that he stole customer funds. (He gave the essays to a crypto influencer, Tiffany Fong, who passed them on to the New York Times.) “They’ve played it incredibly well,” Bankman-Fried wrote of the law firm, which has defended its conduct as proper. “Were it not destructive to just about everything I care about in life, I would tip my cap to them.”

This argument found a willing audience among some FTX victims eager to blame anyone for what happened, helped spur a class-action lawsuit and was presented in Lewis’ book as a plausible explanation for what went wrong at FTX. Sullivan & Cromwell will get paid hundreds of millions of dollars for its work on the bankruptcy, a figure that critics have suggested is excessive. On the other hand, those fees are starting to look like money well spent, since FTX’s bankruptcy attorneys said in January that they expect to recoup enough money to pay customers back in full.

Bankman-Fried’s attorneys seized on this announcement to offer an audacious counterfactual narrative they hoped would get him a more lenient sentence. “The truth is, there were never losses,” Marc Mukasey, the lawyer representing Bankman-Fried at his sentencing, wrote in a March 19 letter to the judge. “The money has always been available. Assets remain. Each victim quoted in the government’s opposition will receive 100 cents on the dollar—plus interest. This would be impossible if the estate’s assets had disappeared into Sam’s personal pockets.” Bankman-Fried sits with his lawyers Torrey Young and Marc Mukasey on Feb. 21, 2024, as he appears in court for the first time since his November fraud conviction.Photographer: Jane Rosenberg/Reuters

The claims weren’t quite as novel as they might’ve seemed. Fraudsters often insist, as Bankman-Fried has, that they would’ve made all the money back if only they’d been allowed to keep going. And bankruptcy lawyers are often successful in eventually cleaning up the messes they find, even in cases of massive fraud. For instance, the administrators overseeing the Bernie Madoff bankruptcy have returned about 90% of clients’ initial investments.

In the case of FTX, recovering assets rests largely on long-shot bets Bankman-Fried made using customer money that wasn’t his to gamble with, such as a $500 million investment in the artificial intelligence startup Anthropic PBC that’s likely now worth more than $1 billion. The biggest factor is crypto prices. FTX’s debts to its customers were fixed in dollar terms on the day the company filed for bankruptcy, when prices were at a low point.

The estate quickly found about $1 billion worth of Solana tokens and $600 million of Bitcoin and related products, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars of other coins. It hired a manager for the assets: Galaxy Digital, run by Mike Novogratz, a Wall Streeter-turned-crypto enthusiast so committed to the cause that he once got the logo for a token tattooed on his shoulder. (That particular token was later found to be a Ponzi scheme.) Predictably, Novogratz’s firm didn’t try to unload FTX’s crypto right away.

Lucky for everyone involved, prices started going back up. The excitement was driven in part by anticipation that US regulators would approve Bitcoin exchange-traded funds, opening that cryptocurrency to a novel group of potential buyers. Bitcoin started rising, along with the prices of other widely traded tokens including Dogecoin, the original memecoin, which has roughly doubled in value since early 2023. New joke coins that trade on the Solana blockchain emerged, seemingly competing to be as stupid or offensive as possible: dogwifhat (the Dogecoin dog but with a hat), Pepe (the symbol beloved by White nationalists) and for those who found that last one too subtle, a token named simply NAZI. Some of them soared to market caps exceeding $1 billion. The price of Solana itself has climbed more than tenfold since FTX’s failure.

The runup means that, on paper, zombie FTX may have gained as much as $10 billion on its Solana bet, though many of the holdings are locked up and can’t be sold for a few years. FTX’s stash of Bitcoin and other tokens likely gained an additional $3 billion at least, based on filings in the bankruptcy case. If the estate is able to sell them all while the market is hot, it’ll have a reasonable claim to the title of greatest crypto trader in history.

The bankruptcy administrator, John Ray III, tried to downplay this achievement in a letter to the judge in Bankman-Fried’s criminal case. “Even taking into account the potential for achieving anticipated recovery levels, which is by no means assured,” he wrote, “customers still will never be in the same position they would have been had they not crossed paths with Mr. Bankman-Fried.” Bankman-Fried leaves a New York federal courtroom in handcuffs on Aug. 11, 2023. A judge revoked his bail after concluding the former CEO had tried to influence witnesses.Photographer: Elizabeth Williams/AP Photo

Unfortunately, the conditions that allowed people to fall for schemes such as Bankman-Fried’s remain: a massive, speculative and largely unregulated industry rife with fraud and manipulation—and a credulous public eager to bet real money in search of a big score.

Bankman-Fried is still doing what he can to spread the hype. Recently, one of the guards at the Brooklyn prison where he’s being held asked him for crypto trading advice, according to a person with knowledge of the interaction, who requested anonymity citing legal concerns. Bankman-Fried suggested the guard sell his XRP tokens and buy Solana.